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DANGEROUS PRECEDENT:
AMERICA’S ILLEGAL WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
BY RYAN T. WILLIAMS*
ABSTRACT
Osama bin Laden’s death has led many to question the efficacy
of America’s continued fighting in Afghanistan. Too often
dismissed is any meaningful discussion of the legality of the war
on terror in Afghanistan, where the United States has promised to
keep fighting until at least 2014. The use of force in international
law is generally forbidden, except under three circumstances: in
self-defense, pursuant to a United Nations Security Council
resolution, or with consent from the leader of an invaded state.
After a careful examination of all three, it is apparent that
America’s continued fighting in Afghanistan, more than a decade
after 9/11, does not fall under any category. By continuing to fight
this illegal war, America loses a significant amount of moral high
ground and tangible international leverage. Worse still, by relying
on an illegitimate leader’s consent as justification for the war,
America unwittingly establishes a precarious blueprint for future
states to follow. Whatever sound (or unsound) reasons America
has for continuing the war, its illegality foreshadows a more
dangerous future.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.

Introduction ................................................................................564
International Law Regarding the Use of Force ......................568
2.1. Self-Defense ...........................................................................569
2.1.1. al Qaeda is Not the Taliban .........................................570

* Assistant Professor, Western State University College of Law. I am grateful
for all of those who provided incisive and invaluable comments along the way,
including William J. Aceves, John E. Noyes, Leslie P. Wallace, and my dearest
Neale B. Gold.

563

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

04 WILLIAMS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

11/30/2011 8:25 PM

564

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:2

2.1.1.1. Case Example No. 1: Nicaragua v.
United States ...............................................................572
2.1.1.2. Case Example No. 2: Prosecutor v. Tadic .......573
2.1.2. Self-Defense Under Historic International Law .........575
2.1.3. Self-Defense Under Article 51.....................................577
2.1.3.1. Necessity and Proportionality in 2011 ...........580
U.N. Authorization ....................................................................586
3.1. Resolutions 1368 and 1373....................................................588
3.2. The Failed State Doctrine ......................................................593
The United States’ Invasion of Afghanistan ..........................594
4.1. Hamid Karzai’s Involvement with the Mujahedin ................595
4.2. Problems After the Fall of the Taliban ...................................596
4.3. The Law of Occupation ..........................................................598
How America Came to Rely on the Consent Doctrine
in Afghanistan ............................................................................600
5.1. The 2004 Afghanistan Election .............................................602
5.2. Aftermath of the 2004 Election ..............................................604
5.3. The 2009 Afghanistan Election .............................................605
Karzai is Not the Legitimate Leader of Afghanistan ............607
6.1. He Was Appointed .................................................................608
6.2. For Years Karzai Maintained Only Temporary Status .........608
6.3. Karzai Lacks Actual Control or Power Over the Region.......609
6.4. Afghanistan’s Judiciary System is Corrupt...........................610
The Unintended Consequences of Fighting
This Illegal War ..........................................................................611
Conclusion ..................................................................................612

“The post-Cold War era . . . began with the collapse of one structure, the
Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and ended with the collapse of another,
the World Trade Center’s twin towers on September 11, 2001.”1
1.

INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001 the United States was attacked when
terrorists hijacked planes and flew them into the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. Nearly 3,000 Americans died, most of

1 John Lewis Gaddis, And Now This: Lessons from the Old Era for the New One,
in THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 1, 3 (Strobe
Talbott & Nayan Chanda, eds., 2001).
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whom were civilians.2 Although members of the terrorist group al
Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks and the United States
believed them,3 the brutality and suddenness of the attacks left the
United States scrambling.
A month later, the United States launched Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF), which was designed to destroy the presence of al
Qaeda in Afghanistan. At that time, the Taliban—a group of unrecognized, illegitimate drug lords—was the de facto ruler of
Afghanistan. Thus, the initial question was whether the United
States could also fight and kill the Taliban for harboring or aiding
al Qaeda. In the ensuing decade, America waged war in
Afghanistan against the Taliban, long after al Qaeda had left the
region. The question has subsequently changed. Can America
legally continue fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, more than ten
years after al Qaeda attacked America? This Article will not debate
the merits of remaining in Afghanistan, or the downsides of a
troop withdrawal, both of which are many. Instead, it will focus
on the more overlooked question: this conflict’s legality. “The
existing law does not address when a state may take pre-emptive
or anticipatory action against a non-state actor, and thus does not
provide an actionable guideline for modern-day armed conflict.”4
This Article will show that even if America’s initial involvement in
Afghanistan arguably comported with international law, its
continued military activity more than a decade later does not
comport with any existing international law regarding the use of
force.
Over the past decade, numerous events have contributed to
this new reality. The most recent event occurred on April 30, 2011,
when American forces, without knowledge or permission from the
Pakistani government, infiltrated the Pakistani border and killed al

2 See Stephen M. Walt, Why They Hate Us (II): How Many Muslims Has the U.S.
Killed in the Past 30 Years?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov. 30, 2009,
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/30/why_they_hate_us_ii_how
_many_muslims_has_the_us_killed_in_the_past_30_years
(providing
an
overview of the deaths attributable to United States/Muslim conflict).
3 See Tony Karon, Eight Years After 9/11: Why Osama bin Laden Failed, TIME,
Sept.
11,
2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599
,1921758,00.html (noting that Osama bin Laden of al Qaeda claimed responsibility
for the attacks).
4 Amos N. Guiora, Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law—a ReEvaluation, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3, 15 (2008).
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Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.5 In the wake of bin Laden’s death,
President Obama announced that the United States would begin
withdrawing troops from Afghanistan.6
The plan calls for approximately 30,000 troops to return to the
United States by the end of 2012.7 The President announced this
great troop reduction as a direct result of bin Laden’s death.
Apparently, since al Qaeda’s leader was killed in Pakistan, the
United States could reduce its fighting of the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
This nonsensical logic and decision making
highlights one of the fundamental problems with the legality of
America’s continued war in Afghanistan.
Since 1949, the United Nations Charter has provided the legal
guidelines governing the use of force in international law. Under
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, member states are prohibited from
any use of force that threatens the territorial integrity of political
independence of any state. This broad threshold against the use of
force has three main exceptions: A state may resort to force (1) in
self-defense, (2) pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution, or
(3) with the consent from the leader of the host state. At various
times throughout the war, America has claimed that its use of force
in Afghanistan falls under all three exceptions, and as such, all
three will be examined in this Article.
The most relatable justification to the general public appears to
be self-defense. There is little doubt America was attacked on 9/11

5 See Scott Wilson et al., Osama bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea,
WASH. POST, May 2, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/osamabin-laden-killed-in-us-raid-buried-at-sea/2011/05/02/AFx0yAZF_story.html
(detailing the U.S. raid which led to bin Laden’s killing).
6 See Jim Sciutto et al., Obama Orders Start to US Troop Withdrawal From
Afghanistan, ABC NEWS (June 22, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics
/president-obama-orders-start-us-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan/story?id
=13908291 (noting President Obama’s pledge to withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops by
the end of 2011, and 23,000 by the summer of 2012).
7 Id. The withdrawal plan was celebrated as America leaving Afghanistan.
In actuality though, the 2012 withdrawal does not eliminate the American
presence in Afghanistan. Indeed, President Obama has more than tripled the
number of troops in Afghanistan since he took office. Id. The 2012 withdrawal
actually only manages to bring the total number of troops to around 70,000, which
is still about double the number of troops that were present when President
Obama took office in 2009. See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks
by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan
and Pakistan (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan
(announcing the deployment of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan).
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and the perpetrators were members of al Qaeda. But, bin Laden’s
death and the subsequent troop withdrawal raise some concerns
about the viability of self-defense as a legal justification for the war
in Afghanistan. If America begins withdrawing from Afghanistan
because the leader of al Qaeda was shot and killed in Pakistan,
how was (and is) the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan selfdefense against al Qaeda?
This Article will also examine why the other two potential
international law exceptions that would allow for U.S. military
force do not apply. Outside self-defense, states can use military
force pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution. However,
there is no U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of
force in Afghanistan. The third exception for the use of force is
consent.
This Article will focus on the consent issue in
Afghanistan, and more specifically, the requisite legitimacy of a
leader necessary to satisfy the consent requirement resulting in a
legal use of force. Traditionally, this determination occurs at the
outset of the hostilities. However, it can also apply in an ongoing
context where force is greatly escalated, such as the American
situation in Afghanistan over the past decade. Here, Afghanistan’s
President Hamid Karzai lacks authority and control over large
parts of Afghanistan.8 The issue is whether an individual who
does not have control over a nation, and never did, can authorize
another country to make war in that nation for more than a decade.
After exploring the exceptions with regard to America’s
escalation of military force and promised continued military
involvement in Afghanistan until years after bin Laden’s death, the
conclusion is that America’s behavior is most likely illegal under
international law. The import of such a finding is great. America’s
persistence to fight an illegal war of this nature—a war neither
based on self-defense, authorized by the U.N., nor fought under
the consent of a legitimate leader—establishes a dangerous
precedent. State A could prop up a leader in a country B, one who
8 See Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
1, 49 (2006) (stating that Hamid Karzai was the Chairman of the Interim
Authority, whose power was often “circumscribed” and of little effect outside the
capital city); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1479, 1489 (2003) (noting that even though Karzai “nominally acts as president,”
much of Afghanistan still remains under control by warlords and drug lords);
Panel Discussion, Building the Institutions of the Nation, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
171, 182 (2004) (stating that the authority of Hamid Karzai was “still being
challenged” at the time of the 2004 panel discussion).
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has no authority outside of the support from State A, and then
State A could proceed to invade and fight a war for more than a
decade based on that leader’s supposed authority. One does not
have to look far to see the problematic nature of setting such a
precedent, with countries like China and Iran growing in stature
and importance. This paradigm for fighting terrorism is not one
that will maintain international peace and security in the long
term. Quite the opposite is true, as it will likely encourage states to
make war in whatever country they desire, under the consent of
supposed leaders they prop up there.
Furthermore, the increase in terrorism against the West by
global and mobile radical jihadists has ensured that the prolonged
conflict in Afghanistan is likely to arise with more frequency in the
future.9 As such, this problem is unlikely to dissipate in the near
future, but rather will be an increasing phenomenon as states that
desire to combat terrorism attempt to legitimize their actions by
utilizing the consent doctrine. The consent doctrine will likely be
the biggest lure for legitimacy because the other two main
justifications for the use force are functionally more problematic.
For example, self-defense, as will be explained in greater detail
later, has specific requirements under international law, including
that resort to the use of force must be necessary and proportional
to the harm or threat of future harm. As individuals continue to
engage in terrorism—as opposed to acting within state sponsored
armies—the traditional laws governing self-defense become more
difficult to apply. Moreover, the other legal way to use force—
acting pursuant to a Security Council resolution—is equally
problematic. For a variety of reasons, including the need for
unanimous permanent member approval, the Security Council
9 See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Sources of Contemporary Terrorism, in ATTACKING
TERRORISM: ELEMENTS OF A GRAND STRATEGY 19, 37 (Audrey Kurth Cronin & James
M. Ludes eds., 2004) (noting that threats across state borders may be “newly
threatening”). Indeed, the new terrorist structures are:

less dependent on internal organizational dynamics to perpetuate
themselves and their activities and more characterized by decentralized
designs with stand-alone groups that are only loosely transnationally
connected . . . .
...
[C]omponent cells that operate independently are much more difficult to
eliminate; destroying the leadership has limited effect on the health of
the overall organization.
Id. at 28–29.
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rarely articulates resolutions authorizing the use of force. Indeed,
one purpose of the United Nations is “to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war.”10 All member states are
supposed to “settle their international disputes by peaceful
means.”11
Thus, without self-defense to rely upon or a Security Council
resolution, states wishing to invade other states to root out terrorist
threats will have only one primary recourse to use force: the
consent from the leader of the would-be invaded state. By
propping up an illegitimate leader in order to continuously achieve
consent, America has negligently established a dangerous
precedent for future unauthorized military actions.
2.

INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE

The rules governing the use of force in international relations
have remained relatively constant since their codification in the
U.N. Charter in 1945. The U.N. Charter, entered into by 198
member states, lists as its primary goal to “maintain international
peace and security, and to that end . . . [engage in] the suppression
of acts of aggression.”12 Also, “the paramount importance of the
Charter of the United Nations” includes “promotion of the rule of
law among nations.”13
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter states that no member state
may use armed force that threatens the “territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.”14 This statement’s placement
within the second article of the U.N. Charter underscores the
importance of the overall goal of the U.N. to limit the use of armed
force in international relations.15 A member state may only use
armed force for peacekeeping and other activities not threatening
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.

U.N. Charter, pmbl.
Id. art. 2, para. 3.
12 Id. art. 1, para. 1.
13 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N.
Doc. A/5217, at 122 (Oct. 24, 1970). G.A. Res. 2625 is the Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
14 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
15 See Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 271,
278 (1985) (noting the “primary position” of Article 2(4) in the U.N. Charter).
10
11
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In this sense, Article 2(4) is a prohibitive law, stating that the
use of force cannot be utilized if it rises to a certain standard. By
contrast, then, it has been argued that if the use of force falls below
this Article 2(4) threshold—in that it does not threaten the
territorial integrity of political independence of another state—then
the use of force is justified under international law.16 Thus, the
United States could possibly apply this logic to justify its military
invasion of Afghanistan—assuming it falls below the threshold of
unallowable uses of force.
This, however, is not the case. The U.S. led invasion of
Afghanistan in October 2001 was initiated precisely to threaten
territorial integrity and political independence of Afghanistan. The
United States did not respect the Taliban government’s wishes:
When the Taliban asked for proof that al Qaeda was there, the
United States provided none.17 Because the United States wanted
to overthrow the Taliban government and kill various suspected
terrorists in their country,18 the United States could not look to
Article 2(4) as legal justification of its war in Afghanistan. Even if
it could, however, America’s continued war against the Taliban a
decade later is a clear violation of Article 2(4).
In order to determine if America’s continued involvement in
Afghanistan against the Taliban is in any way legal under
international law, a review of the list of possible legal uses of force,
or exceptions to Article 2(4), is instructive.
2.1. Self-Defense
There are two main legal bases for self-defense in international
law: historic international law and the U.N. Charter. Before
discussing either, it is important to understand the nature of the
enemy in Afghanistan and how it has evolved over time.

16 See JOHN NORTON MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 55
(2d ed. 2005) (discussing the U.N. Charter and the permissibility for the use of
force).
17 See Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment, The Use of Force Against
Terrorism and International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 835, 836–37 (2001) (exploring the
United States’ self defense justification for its actions in Afghanistan).
18 See DONALD P. WRIGHT ET AL., A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: THE UNITED
STATES ARMY IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM OCTOBER 2001–SEPTEMBER 2005, at
27 (2010) (detailing the initial objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom,
including “to eliminate Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group, al-Qaeda, and to
take down the ruling Taliban regime that harbored these terrorists”).
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2.1.1. al Qaeda is Not the Taliban
Any basic understanding of self-defense is based on the
premise of defense against the attacker. Someone who is being
injured by a member of the New York Giants football team does
not then exact self-defense by injuring every member of the Boston
Red Sox baseball team. Not only are they not from the same team,
they are in a different sport. The former Taliban government of
Afghanistan was not only comprised of a different group of people
than al Qaeda, but they were also a different type, as they were the
government of a state. Members of al Qaeda know no borders and
are bonded by a message of hatred of a singular enemy (the West),
and not by territory, like the Taliban.19 Mainstream media and the
general public often fail to realize one key distinction regarding
America’s recent involvement in Afghanistan: Namely, the fight is
no longer against those who claimed responsibility for 9/11 (if it
ever was). The current war is against the Taliban—not al Qaeda.20
It is generally (though not universally) accepted within the
international community that in the beginning, October 2001, the
Taliban was sufficiently intertwined with al Qaeda to warrant
America’s self-defense against both actors as a result of 9/11.21
Yet, it was al Qaeda who was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. This
raises an important question: can a state invade another state,
claiming self-defense, if that state never attacked it? What if a state
only harbors a group responsible for attacks? More relevant in the
current climate, can an invading state claim self-defense
indefinitely against a state that used to harbor terrorists over a
decade ago? In other words, is there a statute of limitations on self19 See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Introduction: Meeting and Managing the Threat, in
ATTACKING TERRORISM, supra note 9, at 1, 2 (“There is evidence that al-Qaeda has
evolved into a more decentralized, franchised organization, with less direct
control over its cells but more connections with other groups and an increasing
convergence of formerly distinct causes.”).
20 See Lee Ferran, President Karzai: War on Terror Against al Qaeda Not in
Afghanistan, Election Was ‘Good and Fair’, ABC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Afghanistan/afghan-president-hamid-karzaispeaks-diane-sawyer/story?id=8812586 (noting that al Qaeda was thrown out of
the country in 2001, according to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and thus
implying that the fight in Afghanistan is no longer against al Qaeda).
21 Cf. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV.
889, 904 (2002) (noting that “Operation Enduring Freedom properly aimed at
eliminating the military capacity of the Taliban and al Qaeda” but that
“[e]liminating the whole government structure created by the Taliban, as a war
aim was beyond necessary self-defense”).
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defense for merely harboring and does it end at some point after
those offending individuals have left the invaded state?
International law provides only some clarity: “a state will be
responsible if it sends persons to carry out an attack, adopts the
acts of the group after the fact, or develops sufficiently close links
with a terrorist group.”22
2.1.1.1. Case Example No. 1: Nicaragua v. United States
The present situation in Afghanistan has (correctly) drawn
comparisons to the Nicaraguan situation of the mid-1980s. In fact,
“the Nicaragua case is the touchstone for much modern analysis of
the concept of self-defense.”23 In 1986, Nicaragua sued the United
States, claim that it was liable for the actions of the Contras against
the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Specifically, Nicaragua
claimed that “by funding, equipping, supplying, and training the
Contras, who then carried out attacks within Nicaragua, the US
had illegally used force against Nicaragua and was responsible for
all the actions of the Contras.”24
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected Nicaragua’s
claim that the United States was responsible for the Contras’
actions because “to give rise to legal responsibility of the United
States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the
course of which the alleged violations were committed.”25 In short,
because the United States did not exercise “effective control” over
the Contra rebels fighting in Nicaragua, the ICJ held that the
actions of those rebels were not attributable to the United States.26
More specifically, the ICJ held that “the mere ‘assistance to rebels
in the form of provision of weapons or logistical or other support’
22 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a
Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 448–49 (2005) (citing G.A.
Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.19, U.N. Doc.
A/9619, at 143 (Dec. 14, 1974)).
23 THOMAS MICHAEL MCDONNELL, THE UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 261 (2010).
24 Id.
25 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27).
26 See id. (concluding that the actions of Contra rebels could not be attributed
to the United States even if it was “preponderant or decisive, in the financing,
organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its
military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation”).
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was explicitly denied the effect of attributing the responsibility for
private operations to a particular state.”27
“Under that standard, the attack on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon can hardly be qualified as an armed attack on the
part of Afghanistan against the United States.”28 Thus, using
effective control as the test, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, to kill
the Taliban for aiding and harboring al Qaeda, is not a legal selfdefense. “A strict reading of Nicaragua suggests that under the
publically available evidence[,] the Taliban did not[,] on either 11
September 2001 or on 7 October 2001 ‘effectively control’ al
Qaeda.”29 As such, though the international community appears to
accept that the Taliban was initially in some way responsible for
the actions of al Qaeda, it is far from clear that the Taliban
“effectively controlled” al Qaeda.
There may have been
coordination, joint financing efforts, and harboring, but not
necessarily “effective control.”30
2.1.1.2. Case Example No. 2: Prosecutor v. Tadic
Nine years after the Nicaragua case, “the
International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) . . . developed
a new test of attribution—one with a significantly lower threshold
than ‘effective control.’”31 In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTY had to
decide whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
“responsible for the acts of its former soldiers and the military
force after they had formed in a neighboring emerging state
27
Karl M. Meessen, Unilateral Recourse to Military Force Against Terrorist
Attacks, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 341, 345 (2003) (quoting Military and Paramilitary
Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 104).
28 Id.
29 MCDONNELL, supra note 23, at 263 (finding little evidence that the Taliban
directly funded or equipped, let alone issued orders to al Qaeda); see also United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 91
(May 24) (holding that Iran could be liable for injuries incurred by the United
States resulting from hostage-taking at the U.S. Embassy). U.S. v. Iran intimates
that a state may be legally responsible for actions of individual attackers if it
“adopts” the acts of the attackers. There, Iran was responsible for hostage-taking
militants’ actions because of the “failure on the part of the Iranian authorities to
oppose the armed attack by militants . . . and . . . the almost immediate
endorsement by those authorities of the situation thus created . . . .” Id.
30 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Re-Leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
446, 451–52 (2003) (book review) (acknowledging that the Taliban’s and al
Qaeda’s activities might have “coordinated or intertwined” and the effective
control test could be met if al Qaeda or the Taliban gave one another orders).
31 O’Connell, supra note 22, at 449.
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(Bosnia), which broke off or seceded from the original state
[Yugoslavia].”32
The ICTY determined:
The control required by international law may be deemed
to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict,
the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating
or planning the military actions of the military group, in
addition to financing, training and equipping or providing
operational support to that group.33
The ICTY thus established an alternative attribution standard to
that in Nicaragua.34
Yet it is unclear that the Taliban made Afghanistan liable even
under the Tadic standard. There is no specific information that the
Taliban directly funded al Qaeda or provided them with training,
weapons, or supplies.35 If the Taliban only harbored al Qaeda and
did not provide any training or weapons, then the Taliban
probably lacked the requisite “overall control” to become liable
under Tadic.36 In sum: “Tadic and Nicaragua v. United States can be
reconciled to reach the conclusion that the Taliban’s allowing a safe
haven to al Qaeda does not justify the [United States] launching an
invasion of Afghanistan, toppling its government, inserting a new
one in its place, and removing from its soil captured Taliban
militia.”37

MCDONNELL, supra note 23, at 262.
Prosecutor v. Du [Ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 137 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), available at
http://icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
34 Despite claims to the contrary, the proposition that the ICTY established an
alternative standard from Nicaragua holds true. For an explanation as to why
Tadic established a different standard than that used by the ICJ in Nicaragua, see
Christopher Greenwood, War, Terrorism, and International Law, in 56 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 505, 521 (Michael Freeman ed., 2004).
35 See MCDONNELL, supra note 23, at 263–64 (noting that while the Taliban
allowed al Qaeda to conduct activities in Afghanistan, the Taliban could argue
against responsibility under Tadic by claiming “that it did not fund al Qaeda or
provide it with training, weapons, or supplies.”).
36 See id. at 264 (positing that since the Taliban did not provide supplies to al
Qaeda or directly coordinate any of its activities, the Taliban may have arguably
lacked effective or overall control over al Qaeda under Tadic).
37 Id.
32
33
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2.1.2. Self-Defense Under Historic International Law
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan rapidly became a war against
the Taliban and not those responsible for September 11. Thus, the
continued war is likely illegal under the ICJ’s definition of selfdefense against a state harboring terrorists. Despite this likelihood,
the United States has consistently claimed self-defense against the
Taliban as the primary reason for its continued invasion.38 Charles
Allen, then Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs at the
Department of Defense under President George W. Bush,
explained that in a global war on terror, the United States can
lawfully target “‘[a]l Qaeda and other international terrorists
around the world and those who support such terrorists without
warning.’”39 Allen suggested the United States has “the legal right
to target and kill an [al Qaeda] suspect on the streets of Hamburg,
Germany, or any other peaceful place.”40
Much has been written about the dubious legality of the socalled ‘Bush Doctrine’ in general. But does the Bush Doctrine
approach work, specifically, with Afghanistan as of 2010? Is this
type of ‘self-defense’ legal?
As noted earlier, there are two main origins for self-defense
under international law. First, “[i]n 1837, US Secretary of State
Daniel Webster articulated a definition of self-defence, which
evolved into customary international law.”41 This definition arose
from the Caroline case, in which British forces destroyed a U.S.
vessel, the Caroline, while it attempted to deliver goods to
Canadian insurgents.42 The British shot at the Caroline and set it
on fire. Webster declared that Britain’s actions did not constitute
legal self-defense, which was only justified if the “necessity of

38 See Obama, supra note 7 (claiming continued authorization for the United
States to send troops to Afghanistan as a result of the September 11th attacks and
the Taliban’s refusal to turn over Osama bin Laden).
39 O’Connell, supra note 22, at 453. See also Doyle McManus, A U.S. License to
Kill, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A1, A5 (discussing the CIA’s “targeted killing” of
suspected terrorists).
40 See O’Connell, supra note 22, at 453 (explaining the Bush administration’s
position that the September 11th attacks were an act of war by al Qaeda and so the
United States was engaged in war wherever al Qaeda existed).
41 Guiora, supra note 4, at 8.
42 Id. (articulating the events surrounding the Caroline incident).
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[that] self-defense [is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation.”43
After applying the aforementioned historical definition of selfdefense under international law to the United States’ continued
involvement in Afghanistan, it is difficult to argue that the military
invasion is legal. This difficulty is particularly troubling because
the United States has continually claimed self-defense since the
onset of the invasion.44
Initially, the United States might legitimately have claimed that
there was an overwhelming necessity to invade Afghanistan in
October 2001 because more attacks by al Qaeda were promised and
many members of al Qaeda were suspected of hiding out in
Afghanistan.45 It is now widely believed, however, including by
President Karzai himself, that al Qaeda is no longer in
Afghanistan.46 In light of this belief, the United States’ deployment
of 30,000 more troops, announced in December 2009, more than
eight years after the initial invasion, renders untenable the position
that America’s current military presence falls under the auspices of
the Caroline Doctrine of self-defense. This untenable position is
further exacerbated by the lack of any attack on the United States
43 Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or Their
Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights versus the State’s Duty to Protect
its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT’L. & COMP. L.J. 195, 211 (2001) (noting that use of force in
self-defense under this doctrine applies only to the rare case where the need for
self-defense is immediate and there is no way to employ less harmful measures).
44 See President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress and
the American People, ¶ 19–20 (Sept. 20, 2001),
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html [hereinafter
Bush Speech (Sept. 20, 2001)] (announcing the Bush Administration’s intention to
“take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans and demanding
that the Taliban turn over terrorists” or else “share in their fate”); President
George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10
/20011007-8.html [hereinafter Bush Speech (Oct. 7, 2001)] (reporting the
commencement of military strikes on al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan);
Obama, supra note 7 (reaffirming the war’s original goal “to defend our
homeland” in announcing deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan
because the Taliban had purportedly gained momentum and continued to act as
a safe haven for al Qaeda in Afghanistan).
45 See Osama bin Laden, Statement, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 7, 2001,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/07/afghanistan.terrorism15
(threatening continued action against the United States and its allies).
46 See Ferran, supra note 20 (noting the Afghani president’s belief that al
Qaeda was driven out of Afghanistan in 2001).
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by al Qaeda since 9/11, much less by the Taliban or any terrorist
from Afghanistan.
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Caroline Doctrine has
been one basis for which states can rely upon self-defense as a use
of force under international law. By the mid-twentieth century,
however, World War II and Hitler’s advancement throughout
Europe brought new changes to the international legal landscape.
The United Nations was born in 1945 and with it came another,
narrower, concept of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.47
2.1.3. Self-Defense Under Article 51
Though self-defense is a broad and sometimes nebulous
concept, Article 51 of the 1945 U.N. Charter did its best to codify
the main tenets of a legal self-defense action. “In an effort to avoid
repeating the horrors of the Second World War, the UN Charter
calls on nation states to peacefully resolve their conflicts.”48 A
central purpose of the United Nations is “to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war;”49 therefore, “[a]ll members
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means.”50
However, despite a mandate to try and resolve all disputes by
peaceful means, the drafters of the U.N. Charter understood that
states have an inherent right to self-defense. The key would be
outlining the parameters of when and to what extent self-defense is
legally justified.
Article 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall
47 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (reserving the right of member states to engage in
individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack).
48 Guiora, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that Article 51 sought to limit the
circumstances in which countries could implement self-defense against other
member states to encourage settlement of international disputes through peaceful
means).
49 U.N. Charter Preamble, para. 1.
50 U.N. Charter Art. 2, para. 3.
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be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security.51
There are several key provisions worth noting within Article
51. First, it is only supposed to be triggered “if an armed attack
occurs.”52 This is a significant departure from and limitation of the
Caroline Doctrine, which allows for the preemptive use of force if
an attack is imminent. Scholars such as Eugene Rostow have
argued that strict adherence to the “armed attack” requirement of
Article 51 would turn the U.N. into a “suicide pact.”53 States
would conceivably have to wait until fired upon to retaliate, even
as they saw the armies running up to the border or bombers flying
overhead.
Here, however, it is not necessary to engage fully in the “armed
attack” debate because an armed attack on the U.S. preceded
America’s military invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent claims
of self-defense. Nevertheless, Jules Lobel’s description of Article 51
is instructive:
The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force
except when authorized by the Security Council or when
undertaken by individual nations in self-defense and in
response to “an armed attack.” Moreover, as a general
matter, the United Nations has sought to limit the Article 51
self-defense exception to prevent its misuse. First, Article
51 permits only those actions taken in self-defense; reprisals
and retaliations are proscribed under the U.N. Charter. In
other words, a nation can respond to an ongoing attack,
including one waged by a terrorist organization, by using
force. However, that nation may not forcibly retaliate
against another in response to an unlawful act that the
latter committed against the former in the past. The
reasoning behind this rule is simple: a nation subject to an
ongoing attack cannot be expected to wait for the
international community’s aid before fighting back.
Obviously, when a nation is under attack, immediate action
51
52
53

U.N. Charter art. 51.
Id.
Eugene Rostow, Law is Not a Suicide Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1983, at A35.
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is necessary. On the other hand, a nation whose citizens are
no longer being attacked must seek U.N. intervention; to
allow military reprisals would be to encourage the renewed
use of force. This would result in a spiraling escalation of
violence. Thus, the U.S. government, most state actors, the
U.N. Security Council, and the International Court of
Justice have officially taken the position that armed
reprisals are outlawed.54
Thus, it appears that continued military involvement in
another state can only be allowed if the invading state remains
under attack, or, under the Caroline doctrine, under such
imminent threat of attack that there is no time for deliberation.
Such is not the case for the United States in Afghanistan.55 Without
legitimate approval and authority from Karzai, America’s
continued involvement in Afghanistan amounts to nothing more
than a giant—and illegal—military reprisal.
It can certainly be argued, however, that the United States
remains under a general threat of attack from al Qaeda. On
December 25, 2009, a Nigerian man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
tried to blow up a plane from Amsterdam heading from Detroit.56
The man waited almost the entire flight to be sure he was over
American soil before attempting to ignite a bomb.57 He also
claimed ties to al Qaeda and, several months prior to this incident,
his own father reported him for having radical jihadist
tendencies.58
But an ongoing threat from al Qaeda does not legally justify the
ongoing killing of civilians in Afghanistan. By most accounts

54 Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of
Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INTL. L. 537, 540 (1999) (internal citation omitted).
55 But see Saad Gul & Katharine M. Royal, Burning the Barn to Roast the Pig?
Proportionality Concerns in the War on Terror and the Damadola Incident, 14
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DIS. RES. 49, 67–68 (2006) (“The list of terrorist attacks
attributed to al-Qaeda is long and geographically-diverse: Yemen in 1992, Kenya
and Tanzania in 1998, U.S.S. Cole berthed in Yemen in 2000, New York City in
2001, Bali in 2002, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005.”) Notice, however, there
have, at the time of this Article, been no terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since 2001.
56 See Kevin Krolicki & Jeremy Pelofsky, Nigerian Charged with Trying to Blow
up U.S. Jet, REUTERS, Dec. 26, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com
/article/idUSLDE5BP03M20091226 (discussing the details of Abdulmutallab’s
attempted attack and outlining the U.S. reaction to the attempt).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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America is not fighting al Qaeda in Afghanistan anymore—it is
fighting the Taliban.59 Umar Abdulmutallab did not come from
Afghanistan. He is not a member of the Taliban. He is a wealthy
Nigerian twenty-three-year-old who was recruited by al Qaeda in
London and met with a radical American Muslim cleric in
Yemen.60 This situation illustrates the difficulty in pursuing a
global war on terror and highlights the need for clearer guidelines
for when a leader can authorize a military invasion.
At present, more than a decade after the invasion, it is highly
questionable whether the threat of future attacks against the
United States by al Qaeda—originating in Afghanistan—is
credible. Since Osama bin Laden’s death in April 2011, many have
warned of a possible backlash by al Qaeda, a sort of payback for
killing bin Laden.61 But it is highly unlikely that any such attacks
by al Qaeda would originate in Afghanistan, as they have long
since left the region.62 Unfortunately for America, its continued
military involvement in Afghanistan withers under the scrutiny of
the self-defense concepts of necessity and proportionality.
2.1.3.1. Necessity and Proportionality in 2011
“In support of the legality of Operation Enduring Freedom, the
U.S. invoked Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and proclaimed the
59 See Ferran, supra note 20 (noting President Karzai’s comment that al Qaeda
has “’no base in Afghanistan’”); Obama, supra note 7 (addressing the Taliban’s
power and the “military strategy that will break the Taliban’s momentum [in
Afghanistan]”).
60 See Rich Schapiro, Flight 253 Terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Led Life of
Luxury in London Before Attempted Attack, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 27, 2009,
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-12-27/news/17942464_1_umar-faroukabdulmutallab-british-international-school-trafalgar-square
(describing
Abdulmutallah’s background, his family wealth, his education in top schools, and
his luxurious apartment in London’s “poshest neighborhoods”).
61 See DAILY MAIL REPORTER, First the Tears, Now the Anger: Pakistanis Burn
U.S. Flags as Backlash Over bin Laden’s Death Grows, MAIL ONLINE (London), May 4,
2011,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1383011/Osama-Bin-Ladendead-Pakistanis-burn-US-flags-backlash-grows.html (discussing protests and
public burnings of U.S. flags in reaction to bin Laden’s death); Will Brodie, Expert
Warns of Backlash After bin Laden Death, THE AGE (Melbourne), May 2, 2011,
http://www.theage.com.au/world/expert-warns-of-backlash-after-bin-ladendeath-20110502-1e495.html (noting one professor’s prediction that “al-Qaeda will
remain strong without its infamous leader”).
62 See Ferran, supra note 20 (stating that “[a]l Qaeda was driven out of
Afghanistan in 2001.”). According to many, Yemen is the new hotbed of al Qaeda.
See Robert F. Worth, On the Ground in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 24, 2011, at 25,
31 (discussing al Qaeda’s presence and methods of communication in Yemen).
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right to individual and collective self-defense through military
action.”63 By relying on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the United
States indicated that OEF should be evaluated against the
standards for self-defense actions under international law.64
In addition to the requirements already discussed, international
law imposes two more basic requirements on states that engage in
self-defensive armed responses: necessity and proportionality.65
“Although neither requirement is conclusively defined in
international law, each obligation aims to regulate the force needed
to subdue the enemy accomplished with minimal collateral
damage.”66
If America’s continued military involvement in Afghanistan is
necessary and proportional to the threat, then whether Karzai
provides legitimate approval for the continued invasion is legally
irrelevant. The United States would not need to rely on the
consent doctrine exception or a U.N. Security Council resolution
because it would already be acting in accordance with
international law.67
If any nation suffers an attack and
subsequently responds militarily in self-defense within the
confines of Article 51, then its behavior is legal under international
law.
Self-defense’s inapplicability becomes an issue if the
militarily intervention is no longer necessary or proportional to the
threat posed by the invaded state.
To determine whether military intervention is necessary and
proportional, one must look at the stated goals of the intervention.
Former President George W. Bush articulated the military

63 Gul & Royal, supra note 55, at 54. For a history and analysis of the right to
self-defense under international law, see Saad Gul, The Bells of Hell: An Assessment
of the Sinking of ANR General Belgrano in the Context of the Falkands Conflict, 18 N.Y.
INT’L L. REV 81, 89 (2005) (“Article 51 does not create the right of self-defense . . . it
reflects a customary norm that was already well established prior to World War II
by, among others, the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaty
and the 1928 Treaty of Paris.”).
64 Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: the Case for Self-Defense Under
International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 566–67 (2002) (explaining
differences in scope between Article 51 self-defense and inherent right of selfdefense under customary international law).
65 See George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom’s SelfDefense Responses, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 489, 521 (2003) (detailing the “basic
requirements of . . . necessity and proportionality”).
66 Gul & Royal, supra note 55, at 55.
67 Nor would the United States need to rely on the Caroline Doctrine and
other customary international law.
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objectives of the United States in Afghanistan in his September 20,
2001, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and his October 7,
2001, address to the country. America’s three main goals were “[1]
the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure
within Afghanistan; [2] the capture of Al Qaeda and Taliban
leaders; and [3] the cessation of terrorist activities in
Afghanistan.”68
These goals appeared to be reasonable and as such there was
and still is a general international consensus that, initially, the
United States invasion of Afghanistan was both necessary and
proportional.69
But by December 2001 the Taliban government was
extinguished and al Qaeda largely removed from the region.70 As
former CIA analyst Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution
notes “[y]ou have to understand that the CIA considers
Afghanistan its most successful arena. This is where the CIA
believes it has won two wars, in 1989 and 2001.”71 The victorious
war the CIA refers to was America’s self-defense war against al
Qaeda in response to the 9/11 attacks. But that is not who the
United States is fighting in Afghanistan in 2011. Without the
original enemy, America’s continued war making in Afghanistan
against the Taliban has become unnecessary under international
law:
When Kuwait was liberated, the coalition forces did not go
all the way to Baghdad and did not eliminate the regime of

68 K. ALAN KRONSTADT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21658, INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM
IN
SOUTH
ASIA
2
(2003),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21658.pdf. See also Bush Speech (Sept. 20, 2001),
supra note 44 (announcing the start of the ‘War on Terror’ and demanding the
closure of terrorist training camps and the handover of terrorists); Bush Speech
(Oct. 7, 2001), supra note 44 (announcing military strikes in Afghanistan in
response to non-compliance with American demands).
69 See Gul & Royal, supra note 55, at 55 (explaining that Operation Enduring
Freedom met the necessary and proportional requirements); O’Connell, supra note
21, at 908 (“[Operation Enduring Freedom] was a lawful decision since the United
States had initially been the victim of a significant armed attack and it had clear
and convincing evidence of both planned future attacks and Afghanistan’s
responsibility for both past and planned attacks.”).
70 Ferran, supra note 20.
See also O’Connell, supra note 21, at 908
(contemplating the legality of America’s operations in Afghanistan “after the fall
of the Taliban government”).
71 Joe Klein, The CIA Double Cross: How Bad a Blow in Afghanistan?, TIME, Jan.
7, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1952149,00.html.
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Saddam Hussein. . . . Operation Enduring Freedom
properly aimed at eliminating the military capacity of the
Taliban and al Qaeda. Leaders of either group could be
apprehended and brought to justice in the United States or
elsewhere. Eliminating the whole government structure
created by the Taliban, as a war aim was beyond necessary
self-defense.
Attacking other states is wholly
unjustifiable.72
The analogy to Kuwait is interesting and will be explored in more
detail below. But the most striking thing about this assessment is
when it occurred—the summer of 2002. Since then, the United
States has continued to bomb and kill thousands of Afghan
civilians.73 Is it still necessary to kill Afghan civilians in a fight
against the Taliban when al Qaeda is the group that attacked
America more than a decade ago?
There is also strong debate regarding the proportionality of the
continuous attacks in Afghanistan.74 International law “defines
proportionality not in terms of the original aggression,75 but in
terms of what is required to neutralize and deter future aggression:
‘Proportionality contemplates responses parallel in intensity to an
initial aggression and designed to discourage future attacks.’“76
Another definition of proportionality focuses on the endgame.
Does the action taken in response to an attack, or threat of attack,
reduce the threat? Does it eliminate an ongoing attack? “[I]n the
case of action taken for the specific purpose of halting and
repelling an armed attack, this does not mean that the action
O’Connell, supra note 21, at 904.
See Marc W. Herold, A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial
Bombing of Afghanistan, Appendix 4: Daily Casualty Count of Afghan Civilians
Killed by U.S. Bombing and Special Forces Attacks, October 7 Until Present Day
(October 16, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://pubpages.unh.edu
/~mwherold/AfghanDailyCount.pdf.
74 See O’Connell, supra note 21, at 904 (noting “that [the] amount and type of
force” the United States used “may have exceeded both necessity and
proportionality”).
75 Enzo Cannizzaro, The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International
Countermeasures, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 889, 893 (2001).
76 Gul & Royal, supra note 55, at 59–60. However, early international law did
impose such a requirement. See Cannizzaro, supra note 75, at 891 (noting that
“the requirement that the injurious consequences of the response be roughly
equivalent with those of the wrongful act”). See generally Gul & Royal supra, at 53
(detailing events on 9/11 and weeks afterward); BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR
(Simon & Schuster 2002) (chronicling the aftermath of 9/11).
72
73
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should be more or less commensurate with the attack. Its
lawfulness cannot be measured except by its capacity for achieving
The desired results from the initial
the desired result.”77
Afghanistan invasion were clear—remove and weaken al Qaeda
until little or no terrorist activities remain in Afghanistan.78 This
goal was arguably accomplished by December 2001.79 This is
further buttressed by Secretary of State Colin Powell’s comments,
ten days into the initial invasion, in which he indicated America’s
goal was not to entirely eliminate the Taliban.80
Yet despite this seemingly accomplished goal, America remains
militarily engaged in Afghanistan more than a decade later.
Further, in 2010 America significantly ramped up its war efforts by
doubling the number of troops in Afghanistan to specifically
eliminate the Taliban entirely.81 Even with Obama’s proposed
77 Roberto Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] (2)(1)
Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 13, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5–7.
78 See, e.g., Bush Speech (Sept. 20, 2001) supra note 44 (“[T]he United States of
America makes the following demands on the Taliban: . . . Close immediately and
permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every
terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities.”);
Bush Speech (Oct. 7, 2001), supra note 44 (“[T]he United States military has begun
strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan . . . to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist
base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.”).
79 See generally O’Connell, supra note 21, at 904 (indicating that the United
States caused the fall of the Taliban by December 2001 and citing criticism of
certain acts of continued U.S. force after that date); Ferran, supra note 20, paras. 1–
4 (announcing statements by President Hamid Karzai that the war against al
Qaeda should not be in Afghanistan because they were driven out in 2001); Klein,
supra note 71, at 31 (describing how the fatal 2010 attack on the CIA in
Afghanistan challenges many assumptions because the CIA believes it won the
war there in 2001).
80 See O’Connell, supra note 21, at 904 (explaining that although Operation
Enduring Freedom completely routed the Taliban from power, Powell’s statement
indicates that the United States didn’t initially intend to use disproportionate
force, i.e., eliminate the Taliban entirely).
81 See Obama, supra note 7 (announcing President Obama’s plan to send
30,000 more troops to Afghanistan for eighteen months with the overarching aim
of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan);
Eric Schmitt & Tom Shanker, General Calls for More U.S. Troops to Avoid Afghan
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09
/21/world/asia/21afghan.html (describing General McChrystal’s August 2009
report that additional troops were needed in Afghanistan in order to avoid to
avoid mission failure); Sciutto et al., supra note 6 (reporting on the winding down
of the 2010 surge which had purportedly helped advance U.S. objectives aimed at
“disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda and inflicting ‘serious losses’ on the
Taliban”).
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troop reductions in 2011–2012, America is still slated to have
roughly 70,000 troops actively fighting in Afghanistan well into
2014.82 Proponents of the war offer numerous policy reasons to
support America’s continued heavy involvement,83 but is this
behavior really proportional to the threat of al Qaeda coming out
of Afghanistan? The facts simply do not support such an assertion.
Thus, “[t]he most serious question regarding the legality of
[Operation] Enduring Freedom concerns whether the operation
remained necessary and proportional to America’s self-defense
after the fall of the Taliban government.”84
The goals remain primarily the same—and they remain
accomplished.85 Is it really necessary to militarily defeat the
Taliban to keep America safe from the terrorists that were
responsible for the September 11 attacks more than a decade ago?
Notably, there are no claims in the international community that
the Taliban are the “terrorists” directly responsible for 9/11.
82 Sciutto et al., supra note 6 (noting that according to current plans, President
Obama will withdraw 33,000 troops total by the summer of 2012).
83 See Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 81 (describing General McChrystal’s
statements in August 2009 that a failure to “‘gain the initiative and reverse
insurgent momentum in the near term’” creates the risk that defeating the
insurgency will become impossible). The argument that al Qaeda will simply
return to Afghanistan if America leaves is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, perhaps such an inquiry fails to ask the right question. Al Qaeda is
not a local Afghanistan or Pakistan operation. Whether they return to
Afghanistan misses the point, for several reasons. First, followers and members of
al Qaeda no longer need to go to Afghanistan to be trained or to study and learn
jihadist ways to destroy the West. Followers of al Qaeda reside all over the globe,
from Fort Hood, Texas, to Colorado, to Yemen. See, e.g., Deb Feyerich and Jeanne
Meserve, Suspect in Terror Probe Admits Ties to al Qaeda, Official Says, CNN, (Sept.
18, 2009, 9:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/09/18/terror.raid
/index.html (describing the arrest of a 24-year old resident of Colorado and
national of Afghanistan for his involvement in an alleged terrorist plot in the
United States); Hundreds of militants Planning Attacks from Yemen, Foreign Minister
Says, FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story
/0,2933,581370,00.html (reporting that according to the Foreign Minister of
Yemen, hundreds of al Qaeda are planning terror attacks from Yemen). Second,
because al Qaeda is united by an ideology, it has no specific territory (like
Afghanistan) that can be taken to defeat it. Traditional warfare methods, such as
those currently being utilized by the United States through Predator drone
bombing and hand-to-hand combat, may not be effective. See generally Cronin,
supra note 9, at 1 (“[I]nternational terrorism is an enduring challenge that will not
be ‘defeated’ as in a ‘war.’”).
84 O’Connell, supra note 21, at 908.
85 See generally Klein, supra note 71 at 31 (“’You have to understand that the
CIA considers Afghanistan its most successful arena. This is where the CIA
believes it has won two wars, in 1989 and 2001’”).
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Members of the Taliban have not declared a jihad against the
United States or the West. To the contrary, the Taliban claims it
simply wants the United States to leave:
We had and have no plan of harming countries of the
world, including those in Europe . . . our goal is the
independence of the country and the building of an Islamic
state . . . . Still, if you (NATO and U.S. troops) want to
colonise the country of proud and pious Afghans under the
baseless pretext of a war on terror, then you should know
that our patience will only increase and that we are ready
for a long war.86
Regardless of that statement’s veracity, the Taliban is still primarily
comprised of drug lords that are defending themselves against the
onslaught of American troops.87 Thus, despite claims to the
contrary, America’s military involvement is no longer a selfdefense action against al Qaeda that comports with the concepts of
necessity and proportionality under Article 51.88
America
continues to embark on a new war against the Taliban. America’s
continued reliance on Article 51’s self-defense provision to justify
this war is misplaced and unjustifiable.
3.

U.N. AUTHORIZATION

If a State cannot legitimately use force (1) under the Caroline
doctrine; (2) in self-defense under Nicaragua’s “effective control”
test or the Tadic test; or (3) as a necessary and proportional
response under Article 51, there is still another way to legally use
force—by obtaining U.N. Security Council approval. Thus, despite
America’s apparent lack of legal authority for the use of force in
86 Sayed Salahuddin & Peter Graff, Taliban Say Control Area After Battle with
U.S., REUTERS, Oct. 7, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article
/idUSSP402619.
87 This is not to argue that the Taliban are kind and fair individuals worthy of
ruling Afghanistan. But however undesirable and violent they may be, they are
not radical jihadists like members of al Qaeda. See generally GRETCHEN PETERS,
SEEDS OF TERROR (2009) (describing the pervasive narcotics trade by the Taliban in
Afghanistan and the extensive resulting profits to the insurgency in Afghanistan,
and arguing that nexus between drug traffickers and terrorist groups is the new
axis of evil).
88 See generally O’Connell, supra note 21, at 902–04 (describing four conditions
for a country to take military action against another state in self-defense in
absence of a U.N. Security Council authorization, including that force be
necessary and proportional to the injury threatened).
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Afghanistan under all the aforementioned possible legal
justifications, a U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing the
use of force would legitimize its continued military invasion.
Long before the United States invaded Afghanistan, the U.N.
passed a Resolution which helped clarify the rules for international
use of force. That Resolution, entitled the Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (U.N. Declaration), was passed in 1970 on the 25th
anniversary of the U.N.89 The U.N. Declaration was particularly
concerned with state sovereignty in the new emerging
interconnected global world. To that end, the U.N. Declaration
codified seven principles, five of which are directly relevant to
America’s continued military involvement in Afghanistan:
(a) The principle that States shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations, . . .
(c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter, . . .
(e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, . . .
(f) The principle of sovereign equality of States, . . .
(g) The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the
Charter . . . .90
Principle (a) is essentially a recitation of Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. As already noted, America’s use of force in Afghanistan
easily violates this principle, as the use of force is designed to
threaten the political independence and territorial integrity of the
state. By unilaterally using force to overthrow the current
government of Afghanistan, a country that never attacked it, the
United States violated the first Principle of the Declaration.
America also arguably violated Principle (c).
The
establishment of the Interim Authority is not inherently against
89
90

G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 13.
Id.
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international law in it of itself. But when coupled with the rest of
America’s actions, the installation of the Interim Authority
constitutes intervention within the domestic jurisdiction of another
state, in this case to America’s benefit. America helped install an
ersatz government with a puppet leader, and continued to conduct
war in that country at the behest of that appointed leader, who
remained in power through rigged elections and security provided
by America. The rigged elections of 2004 and 2009 also violate
Principle (e), as the self-determination and equal rights of the
Afghan people are not being observed when in 2004 the American
backed Karzai government made sure that Karzai received “over
75% of all state and radio coverage” and “85% of all the editorial
coverage of candidates” nor when election fraud has taken place.91
This is not the behavior of a state that values the sovereign equality
of all states. (Principle (f)).
Finally, Principle (g) requests that member states fulfill in good
faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the
Charter. The U.N. Charter obliges all member states “to peacefully
resolve their conflicts.”92 Its preamble states the purpose of the
United Nations is “to save the succeeding generations from the
scourge of war.”93 “All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means . . . .”94 The unilateral actions of the
United States in Afghanistan do not comport with its obligations
under the U.N. Charter, unless, of course, there is specific U.N.
Security Council Resolution authorizing and approving of the
continued use and extent of force in Afghanistan against the
Taliban.
3.1. Resolutions 1368 and 1373
Following the 9/11 attacks on America, the U.N. Security
Council swiftly passed two resolutions addressing appropriate
responses to terrorism. The first, passed September 12, 2001, is
Resolution 1368, the key provisions of which are as follows:
The Security Council, Reaffirming the principles and purposes
of the Charter of the United Nations, Determined to combat
91 Andrew North, ‘Heavy Poll Bias’ Towards Karzai, BBC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2004,
5:32 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3712460.stm.
92 Guiora, supra note 4, at 9.
93 U.N. Charter Preamble, para. 1.
94 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
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by all means threats to international peace and security
caused by terrorist acts, Recognizing the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the
Charter, . . .
3. Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to
justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these
terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for
aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators,
organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held
accountable;
4. Calls also on the international community to redouble
their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including
by increased cooperation and full implementation of the
relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and
Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269
(1999) of 19 October 1999;
5. Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to
respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to
combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations . . .
.95
And two weeks later, the Security Council passed 1373:
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999)
of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, . .
. Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of
international terrorism, constitute a threat to international
peace and security, Reaffirming the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the
Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution
1368 (2001), . . . 2. Decides also that all States shall: . . . (b)
Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to
other States by exchange of information; . . . 3. Calls upon all
States to: . . . (c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral
and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent

95

S. C. Res. 1368, pmbl. arts. 3–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
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and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against
perpetrators of such acts . . . .96
Notably, neither of these resolutions specifically authorizes the
use of military force in Afghanistan. Some scholars argue,
however, that these resolutions articulate a new set of rules
regarding self-defense and the use of force in international
relations.97 There are others, such as Thomas Franck, who argue
that these resolutions do in fact authorize the United States to use
force against the Taliban, and they do so without creating a new set
of self-defense laws.98 “Resolution 1368 makes even clearer, in the
context of condemning the September 11 attack on the United
States, the responsibility for terrorism of ‘sponsors of these terrorist
attacks’ including those ‘supporting or harbouring the
perpetrators.’ (para. 3). The Taliban clearly fit that designation.”99
Franck wrote this in 2001, when arguably those responsible for
“supporting or harboring the perpetrators”, al Qaeda, were still in
Afghanistan. But that was more than a decade ago, and al Qaeda
has largely left the region.100 For example, bin Laden and members
S. C. Res. 1373, pmbl., arts. 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Editorial Comment, Hegemonic International Law
Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 873, 879 (2003) (surveying the recent practice of the
U.N. Security Council and the refusal to explicitly endorse Operation Iraqi
Freedom, as evidence of the Council’s new ‘legislative phase’ in which it has
created legally binding regulations rather than authorize specific responses to
specific instances involving specific states). The veracity of this argument is in
doubt, however, as evidenced by Alvarez’s parade of qualifiers before articulating
it:
96
97

Given the legislative efforts in at least one of those resolutions (1373) and
the tendency for many of the Council’s actions to be read as having
broader normative effect, the prospective endorsement of individual and
collective self-defense by the Council, together with its later acquiescence
in Operation Enduring Freedom, may signal, depending on how the
Council’s license comes to be interpreted by its licensee, the advent of
three new general rules with respect to defensive force in the age of
terrorism.
Id. (citations omitted).
98 Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comments, Terrorism and the Right of SelfDefense, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 839, 842–43 (2001) (arguing that Resolutions 1368 and
1373 expand the definition of an attack and an attacker, but preserve a state’s
discretion to define an attack as part of the inherent right of self-defense
preserved in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter).
99 Id. at 841.
100 See generally O’Connell, supra note 21, at 908 (“It appears that
proportionality is the concept around which the law of armed conflict and
international criminal law enforcement are coming to coalesce. September 11 and
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of his family were found and killed in their home of more than five
years in Pakistan.101 It is highly doubtful that those responsible for
the September 11 attacks, and in particular the specific members of
the Taliban that harbored them, are still in Afghanistan. It is even
more doubtful that the Security Council, in passing Resolution
1368, meant to give the United States authorization to war against
the Taliban until 2025.102 Thus, though Franck may be correct in
that, as of 2001, Security Council Resolution 1368 did arguably
authorize America to use force against the Taliban in Afghanistan
because in 2001 they were harboring the perpetrators of September
11, that same resolution can no longer be relied upon in 2011 for
America’s continued war against the remaining members of the
Taliban, as the perpetrators of September 11 are likely long gone.103
In short, the Taliban has nothing left to harbor.
Others disagree further and maintain these resolutions do not
introduce a broader meaning of self-defense, even if directed only
at terrorism.104 According to Greg Maggs, Resolution 1368 “did
not say what the right to self-defense entails. Most particularly, it
did not say that al Qaeda had committed an ‘armed attack’ for the
purposes or [sic] Article 5 and it did not say that the United States
had a right to act in self-defense in response to the attack by al
Qaeda.”105

its aftermath show that the once-clear divisions between crime and war are
breaking down.”); Ferran, supra note 20 (noting President Karzai’s statement that
“’Al Qaeda was driven out of Afghanistan in 2001’”).
101 Wilson et al., supra note 5 (describing the raid which killed Osama bin
Laden in Pakistan).
102 See Joshua Keating, Karzai Sees Foreign Troops in Afghanistan for up to 15
Tears,
Morning
Brief,
FOREIGN
POL’Y,
Jan.
28,
2010,
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/88604 (reporting President Karzai’s 2010
statements at a multi-national conference that an international presence could be
in Afghanistan for up to fifteen years to develop sustainable Afghan security
forces).
103 See generally O’Connell, supra note 21, at 908 (noting that after the fall of
the Taliban government self-defense may no longer a valid basis for the United
States’ continued warfare in Afghanistan); Ferran, supra note 20 (“Afghan
President Hamid Karzai said that the fight against al Qaeda was not in his
country, but he welcomes additional U.S. troops to help protect the population”).
104 See Alvarez, supra note 97, at 879 (arguing that the legislative efforts in the
resolutions, along with additional factors, may signal the advent of new general
rules with respect to defensive force in the age of terrorism).
105 Gregory E. Maggs, The Campaign to Restrict the Right to Respond to Terrorist
Attacks in Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and What the United States
Can Do About It, 4 REGENT J. INT’L L. 149, 166 (2006).
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What can generally be agreed upon is that while the resolutions
may not be clear in what they authorize, they are clear in what they
do not authorize.106 The concluding language of Resolution 1368
comes closest to authorizing the use of force, when the U.N.
Security Council stated its “readiness to take all necessary steps to
respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat
all forms of terrorism . . . .”107 Compare that language, however, to
that of Security Council Resolution 678, regarding Iraq’s 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Resolution 678 specifically “[a]uthorizes
Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait . . . to
use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area.”108
In 1990, the Security Council specifically authorized member
states to use whatever force necessary to expel Saddam Hussein
from Kuwait. None of the current resolutions regarding the
attacks of September 11 similarly authorize any state to use
whatever means necessary to expel and destroy al Qaeda
anywhere in the world. Moreover, enacting such a resolution
would not likely solve the crux of the problem. The situation in
Afghanistan is, at a minimum, a standard deviation away from
Kuwait in 1990, as America’s war in Afghanistan is no longer
directed against al Qaeda, whereas America’s intervention in
Kuwait was directed against Saddam Hussein.109 Thus, though
there may be confusion regarding what Resolutions 1368 and 1373
affirmatively authorize, it seems clear that they do not authorize
the indefinite use of military force against the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
“Instead, the coexisting International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), established by Resolution 1386, has an
explicit, though very limited, mandate to assist the new Afghan

106 See Guiora, supra note 4, at 14–15 (stating that the resolutions may have
neither said that al Qaeda had committed a qualifying armed attack nor that the
US had a right to respond in self-defense). “Security Council Resolutions 1368
and 1373—do not provide a sufficiently clear guideline regarding when a state
may act.” Id. at 15.
107 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 95, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
108 S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
109 See PETERS, supra note 87, at 21 (describing the current war by the United
States against the Taliban’s drug trafficking); Ferran, supra note 20 (reporting
statements by President Karzai that al Qaeda was driven out of Afghanistan in
2001).
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authorities in maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding
areas.”110
3.2. The Failed State Doctrine
The situation in Afghanistan is somewhat unique in that it can
be argued that Afghanistan has some of the hallmarks of a failed
state. A failed state is a state that lacks a functioning political
decision-making process and fails to “exercise meaningful control
over its borders or territory.”111 At present, there is no failed state
doctrine in international law with respect to use of force. This is
most likely the result of the inherent difficulties in promulgating
such a doctrine.112 However, a failed state designation, or lack
thereof, is beside the point for the purposes of the use of force in
Afghanistan. Regardless of whether a state has officially “failed”
or not, characteristics of that state’s leader can still be examined to
determine whether he or she is authorized to allow a military
invasion in his or her state. The difficulties of having a system that
rests on a particular definition of a controversial term, such as failed
state, are many. Attempts to regulate torture, for instance, aptly
demonstrate such difficulties. The word torture is so difficult to
define that any laws that prohibit the use of torture are subject to
widely varying interpretation, no matter how extensive the
definition. The resulting inconsistency has led to widespread
abuses worldwide.113
Thus, for the purposes of allowing a foreign military to make
war in a state, the decision should not turn on whether that state
has officially been classified as a failed state. Whether an arguably
failed state can be invaded and held accountable for the actions of
rebels or terrorists within its territory remains unclear under either
110 Jaume Saura, Some Remarks on the Use of Force Against Terrorism in
Contemporary International Law and the Role of the Security Council, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 7, 22 (2003).
111 Ben N. Dunlap, State Failure and the Use of Force in the Age of Global Terror,
27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 469 (2004).
112 See id. at 470 (“State failure has no legal meaning under international law.
States have legal personality that outlives any one regime or government, and
their status cannot be terminated by other states. Moreover, the criteria for
statehood are interpreted quite flexibly.”).
113 See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds. 2005) (compiling the Bush Administration’s
legal memoranda which supported the use of torture).
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the Nicaragua or Tadic standards.114
This underscores the
importance of having legitimate rulers in place before authorizing
the use of military force in the territories of such states. This
practical focus should minimize legal loopholes and add
legitimacy to any unilateral invasion of a state that may be
harboring terrorists.
4.

THE UNITED STATES’ INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

In order to properly assess the legitimacy of utilizing the
consent doctrine as justification for America’s continued war in
Afghanistan, a review of how Hamid Karzai came into power there
is instructive. In 2001—in direct response to the September 11th
attacks—the United States invaded Afghanistan under the
operation referred to as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).115
President George W. Bush articulated the military objectives of the
United States in Afghanistan both in his September 20th Address
to a Joint Session of Congress and his October 7th address to the
country. As previously stated, the three main goals of OEF were:
“[1] the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure
within Afghanistan, [2] the capture of Al Qaeda and Taliban
leaders, and [3] the cessation of terrorist activities in
Afghanistan.”116
Moving quickly, the United States teamed up with the
Northern Alliance—a coalition of Afghan militias opposed to the
Taliban regime—to remove the Taliban from Kabul within three
weeks of the October 7, 2001 invasion.117 Per prior U.S. custom, the
United States stated that it did not desire to remain a de facto
power. Instead, it helped facilitate a new interim government out
of whole cloth—the Interim Authority. Meetings between the U.N.

114 See O’Connell, supra note 22, at 449–50 (noting that applying the
prevailing Tadic test to a failed state is less clear, but the “better argument” is that
if a state is unable to control terrorist activities in its territory, a state may use
force in self-defense against attacks originating in the failed state).
115 See Bush Speech (Oct. 7, 2001), supra note 44 (announcing military strikes
against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and Taliban military installations of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan “to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist
base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime”).
116 Supra text accompanying note 68.
117 See Harris, supra note 8, at 48 (noting that the United States allied with the
Northern Alliance and took control of Kabul by November 2001); Koh, supra note
8, at 1489 (characterizing an “extraordinarily swift and successful military
campaign to oust the Taliban and restore democracy” in Afghanistan).
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and expatriate groups in Germany decided that Hamid Karzai
would lead the Interim Authority, which “shall be the repository of
This became known as the Bonn
Afghan sovereignty.”118
Agreement and was signed on December 5, 2001.119 Thus, before
the conclusion of 2001, it appeared the Bonn Agreement and the
Interim Authority restored sovereignty to Afghanistan. The
Taliban were driven from Kabul, and a new interim leader was
abruptly installed in their place. But to refer to Karzai as the leader
of Afghanistan is misleading. The reality was—and still is—far
different.
4.1. Hamid Karzai’s Involvement with the Mujahedin
To understand the extent of Karzai’s authority and leadership
(or lack thereof), it is useful to understand how and why he was
chosen to become the interim leader. In 1979, the former Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan. Under the Reagan administration,
the United States applied the time-tested “enemy of my enemy is
my friend” approach to international relations, and subsequently
decided to fund the rebellion in Afghanistan.120 Specifically, the
CIA funded the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), or
essentially the Pakistani version of the CIA.121 It was in the CIAfunded ISI alliance that the idea of “jihad” was invoked to
motivate rebellious militants against the “secular communists.”122
It was not difficult to motivate certain angry, devout Muslims or to
convince them to view the Soviets as unholy, rebel invaders of
their land. In short, “the U.S. allowed the use of Islamic religious
doctrine and propaganda to galvanize groups of Muslims in order
to fight America’s war against the Soviets.”123

118 Harris, supra note 8, at 49 (quoting Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent
Government Institutions, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001)).
119 See id. at 49 (referring to the December 5, 2001 agreement as “the Bonn
Agreement”).
120 See Zack Hofstad, Do Unalienable Rights Apply to All? Extreme Shari’a Law
and How United States Foreign Policy Towards Iran and Afghanistan Has Fueled Its
Spread, 6 REGENT J. INT’L L. 191, 216–17 (2008) (describing the United States’
Pakistan-centered response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).
121 See id. at 215–16 (noting that the CIA funded the ISI).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 216.
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A radical group of jihadist fighters, “[t]he mujahedin, or holy
warriors,” emerged from the CIA-ISI alliance.124 The mujahedin
believed in “jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no
conferences, and no dialogues.”125 In total, somewhere between
10,000–80,000 mujahedin were trained by the CIA-funded ISI to
fight against the Soviets during the 1980s.126 Hamid Karzai was
one of them.127
4.2. Problems After the Fall of the Taliban
By December 2001 the Interim Authority was specifically
established in Afghanistan to take over and temporarily be in
command.
Karzai, a former mujahedin warrior, was only
supposed to be the leader for the period before an official
Constitution was drafted, a task mandated to be completed within
eighteen months.128
The initial idea was for Karzai to form a legitimate government
in Afghanistan.129 That has failed to materialize. “The Karzai
regime has little authority over most of Afghanistan.”130 Indeed,
after nearly a decade since Karzai took over, his authority remains
as tenuous as ever: “every aspect of the intelligence community’s
work in Afghanistan is being called into question. According to a
report, made public—remarkably—by Major General Michael
Flynn, military intelligence has been ‘ignorant’ about the local
power structures in combat areas, imperiling U.S. troops on the
ground.”131 There are local power structures in the combat areas
Id.
Id. (quoting MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM 127 (2004)).
126 Id.
127 See
President Hamid Karzai, THE EMBASSY OF AFGHANISTAN,
http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/president.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2011) (detailing Karzai’s involvement with the mujahedin in Pakistan during the
1980s and his subsequent involvement with the mujahedin government in
Afghanistan during the 1990s).
128 See Thomas H. Johnson, The Prospects for Post-Conflict Afghanistan: A Call of
the Sirens to the Country’s Troubled Past, 5 STRATEGIC INSIGHTS (2006),
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2006
/Feb/johnsonFeb06.pdf (assessing Afghanistan’s current politics, development
and stability).
129 See Harris, supra note 8, at 49 (describing how U.S. presence in
Afghanistan is a form of occupation).
130 Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the
Women of Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 349, 360 (2004).
131 Klein, supra note 71, at 31.
124
125
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because Karzai does not have actual power over them. Yet, the
United States continues to conduct war in Afghanistan under the
authority and approval provided by Karzai, the man who lacks
power and control. Is this specter of authority sufficient to satisfy
international law?
After a cursory examination of the situation, it would appear
so. The United States and the U.N. both recognize Karzai as the
Recognition is the “formal
leader of Afghanistan.132
acknowledgment by existing States of the normal political
consequences flowing from the status of the entity that is
recognized.”133 Recognition can legitimize a de facto leadership
situation.134 Furthermore, U.N. admission can equal recognition.135
Thus, at first glance, America and the U.N.’s approval would
appear to conclude the inquiry—Karzai is the leader of
Afghanistan. But a deeper inquiry into the matter reveals
otherwise. Karzai was forcefully imposed on the Afghan people,
and militarily protected, in large part, by America. Moreover, by
most accounts, al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for 9/11,
has long since left the region.136 Osama bin Laden, found in
Pakistan, not Afghanistan, is dead.137 Thus, America’s war in
Afghanistan is against the Taliban, a group who never attacked
America. It is here that the United States’ continued presence in
Afghanistan is especially troubling. Does an imputed leader such
as Karzai have the legitimacy to authorize such a use of force in
“his” state against a foe that never attacked America?
An affirmative answer would set a dangerous precedent for the
world. Any nation, from China to Venezuela, could first invade a
132 See, e.g., Pamela Constable & Joshua Partlow, Karzai Declared Winner of
Afghan Election a Day After Rival Quits, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/02
/AR2009110203455.html (noting that U.N., U.S., and European officials
congratulated Karzai on his reelection to the Afghan Presidency).
133 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 539–40
(2d ed. 2006).
134 See id. at 540 (noting that the effect of a “collective acknowledgement of
status (or its collective denial)” is sometimes “to legitimize a de facto situation.”).
135 See id. (“[T]he collective acknowledgment of status that might have been
effected by a system of organized collective recognition is achieved by admission
to the United Nations . . . .”).
136 See Ferran, supra note 20 (noting Karzai’s statement that al Qaeda is no
longer in Afghanistan, having been “driven out . . . in 2001”).
137 See, e.g., Wilson et al., supra note 5 (reporting the death of Osama bin
Laden in a U.S. raid).
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country, then have a leader installed who was subsequently
protected by its military, and then on the newly installed leader’s
apparent authority, remain militarily active in that nation, killing
the native people for more than a decade without any international
legal repercussions. How would the United States react if China
did this in Taiwan?138 America’s continued war in Afghanistan
supposedly legitimized by Karzai’s blessing is a very dangerous
precedent that will likely be an increasingly common phenomenon,
as “[t]raditional state v [sic] state war is largely a relic.”139
4.3. The Law of Occupation
Though Afghanistan is a particularly useful example in many
ways, it is important to note that it is not the perfect example of the
consent doctrine. That is because many of the legitimacy problems
regarding Karzai, which will be discussed below, arise in a context
where America is already militarily present in Afghanistan. In
more general terms, the cleanest example would be to assess the
legitimacy of a leader to determine consent before a military
invasion takes place. Here, America invaded Afghanistan in
October 2001, before Karzai took office. Thus, some discussion
regarding the law of occupation is necessary before proceeding
with Afghanistan as an example of a state with a leader who may
not have the requisite legitimacy to authorize the foreign use of
force.
The term “occupying power” has a specific definition under
the various international laws and agreements that comprise the
Law of Armed Conflict.140 “Territory is considered occupied when
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.”141
138 This idea may not be as far-fetched as it seems. The world is no longer
unipolar, and China very well may be able to persuade the U.N. to recognize a
leader of a country that is not a real leader in any practical sense of the word.
America’s continued war in Afghanistan could serve as a model to China and
others.
139 Guiora, supra note 4, at 3.
140 The Law of Armed Conflict is comprised of the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907, in addition to the four Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929,
and 1949, as well as the Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005. See, e.g., William
H. Taft, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L
L. 319–20 (2003) (arguing in favor of the Law of Armed Conflict’s appropriateness
as a “legal framework for regulating the use of force in the war on terrorism”).
141 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, U.N.T.S. 539 (outlining the circumstances in which
territory is considered occupied).
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Moreover, “occupation extends only to the territory where such
authority has been established and can be exercised.”142 It is
important to note, however, that:
[T]he degree of control that the foreign military force
exercises over specific territory may ebb and flow, making
such broad tests of occupational authority difficult to apply
. . . . As Eyal Benvenisti notes, however, the modern
concept of occupation, as exemplified by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1483, only contemplates a temporary
term of authority by the foreign power over the occupied
territories . . . .143
Thus, with respect to America’s involvement in Afghanistan, it
may be argued that America is simply an occupying power and
therefore does not need the approval of Karzai to continue its
current military operations.
Such a decision would be premature, however. First, even
assuming, arguendo, that America is merely the occupying power,
it is only supposed to have control where “such authority has been
established and can be exercised.”144 Much of the fighting is
occurring in parts of Afghanistan in which the local warlords and
the Taliban, not the United States or Karzai, are in control.145 No
clear authority has been established. This argument resonates with
some scholars so strongly that is leads them to conclude that
because of this, Karzai cannot possibly provide legitimate consent
for war in Afghanistan.146
Second, America is not merely an “occupying power,” as it is
doing far more than just occupying Afghanistan. The fighting has
dramatically increased over time, and in the first few months of
2010 America added 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan.147 Such a
Id.
Richard Morgan, The Law At War: Counterinsurgency Operations and the Use
of Indigenous Legal Institutions, 33 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 62 (2010).
144 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note
141, art. 42 (referring to the definition of an occupied territory).
145 See Drumbl, supra note 130, at 360 (explaining that the Karzai government
“has little authority over most of Afghanistan”); Klein, supra note 71 (quoting
Major General Michael Flynn as stating that military intelligence has been
“ignorant” of Afghanistan’s local power structures).
146 See Saura, supra note 110, at 22 (arguing that the U.S. presence in
Afghanistan is not authorized by Resolution 1373).
147 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Helene Cooper, Obama Adds Troops, but Maps
Exit
Plan,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
1,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com
142
143
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dramatic increase in troops, which (for reasons that will be
explained later) resulted only after a yearlong wait for Karzai’s
approval, changes the character of any previous occupation into a
military offensive. Since this influx of troops, this has been, in a
sense, a whole new war. This new war makes Afghanistan, though
not historically obvious, a particularly useful example of the
consent doctrine and the requisite authority a leader needs to
authorize the foreign use of force. It is in that vein that Karzai’s
leadership will be further explored.
5. HOW AMERICA CAME TO RELY ON
THE CONSENT DOCTRINE IN AFGHANISTAN
The United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 in search of
those responsible for 9/11—al Qaeda.
Since the Taliban
government of Afghanistan was protecting or harboring al Qaeda
members, the United States claimed self-defense as authorization
for the war.148 In reality, the United States had little other choice
under international law. As it has been discussed, the U.N.
Security Council did not authorize the use of force in
Afghanistan.149 The invasion on its face violated Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, prohibiting any use of force that threatens the
territorial integrity of political independence of any state. This left
the United States claiming self-defense against a foe, the Taliban,
which never attacked it.
This is the basic underpinning of the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war. “[A]s a matter of common sense and self-defense,
America will act against such emerging threats before they are
fully formed.”150 In a sense, the United States announced it had the
/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.html?pagewanted=all (discussing President
Obama’s deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan).
148 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the use of force against those who
planned the attacks of September 11, 2001); Bush Announces Opening of Attacks,
CNN
(Oct.
7,
2001),
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-1007/us/ret.attack.bush_1_qaeda-targets-al-kandahar?_s=PM:US (discussing the
commencement of U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan in response to Afghanistan’s
refusal to “close terrorist training camps, turn over al Qaeda leaders and return
international citizens detained in Afghanistan”).
149 Further, the Security Council also did not authorize the indefinite use of
force in Afghanistan, long after al Qaeda had left and bin Laden had been killed.
150 OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 2002), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002.
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authority to strike whomever, whenever, if, in the sole opinion of
the United States, any country somehow posed a danger or
potential danger, or harbored someone who posed a potential
danger to United States.151 Many scholars, in the United States and
abroad, have criticized the Bush Doctrine, as it marked a sharp
departure from international law governing the use of force.152
Though some accepted the idea of invading a foreign country to go
after terrorists that attacked their country, they would not accept
that notion indefinitely.153 How long can the United States stay in
Afghanistan and claim self-defense against al Qaeda?
According to Karzai himself, “al Qaeda was driven out of
Afghanistan in 2001.”154 In fact, when bin Laden was found and
killed in Pakistan in April 2011, it was discovered that he had been
operating and running al Qaeda from that base camp in Pakistan
for at least the past five years.155 Thus, from as early as 2002, the
United States has not been fighting al Qaeda with its war in
Afghanistan. It has been fighting against the Taliban, making
claims of self-defense dubious.
America recognized early on that since al Qaeda was largely
absent from Afghanistan, the legality of its war there was
increasingly tenuous. As a result, the United States quickly
decided to hold free and fair democratic elections in Afghanistan
by 2004. This was not borne out of altruism or a strong desire to
see the Afghan people have a free society. Rather, the United
States needed a legitimate and legal reason to continue making war
in Afghanistan, against a foe that never attacked it. America
151 See Peter Baker, Bush to Restate Terror Strategy, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/15
/AR2006031502297.html (reiterating President Bush’s strategy to preemptively
strike the terrorists).
152 See Jane Gilliland Dalton, The United States National Security Strategy:
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 52 NAVAL L. REV. 60, 60 (2005) (noting that
President Bush’s National Security Strategy contains “four major themes with
significant international law implications”).
153 See MCDONNELL, supra note 23, at 261 (discussing attempts to limit the
right of self-defense in an effort to avoid further violence, and discussing other
potentially analogous scenarios, including whether the United States could justify
its attack on Nicaragua with a self-defense argument); O’Connell, supra note 21, at
889 (“At the outset, [the operation] did indeed meet the conditions of lawful selfdefense, but later stages of the operation may have gone beyond the bounds of
proportionality.”).
154 Ferran, supra note 20.
155 See Wilson et al., supra note 5 (detailing the events surrounding Osama bin
Laden’s death).
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needed Karzai to be elected by the people, so his consent to the war
could create at least the illusion of legitimacy for its continued
invasion and active military presence in Afghanistan.156
5.1. The 2004 Afghanistan Election
In 2004 the United States announced that Afghanistan was
going to have a fair and democratic election.157 The seemingly
democratic system installed in Afghanistan by the Interim
Authority called for an elected President of Afghanistan to serve a
five-year term.158 In order to avoid a run-off, the winner of the
general election in Afghanistan also had to have more than fifty
percent of the popular vote.159 Thus, heading into the 2004 election
America’s primary focus was ensuring, at all costs, that Hamid
Karzai received more than fifty percent of the vote.
Those costs included an unfair democratic process. By all
accounts, the 2004 election appeared to be rigged.160 From the
beginning, the United States made sure the message was out that
Karzai was supposed to win, by ensuring that Karzai received
“over 75% of all state TV and radio coverage” since campaigning
began in late 2004.161 On the state-controlled Afghan radio—a key
medium in Afghanistan—Karzai received eighty-five percent of all

156 There is mounting evidence of this as more details have emerged from
Karzai’s most recent “election.” One example is his recent pronouncement that
American troops need to be actively engaged in Afghanistan until at least 2020.
See Keating, supra note 102.
157 See Ahto Lobjakas, Afghanistan: NATO, U.S. Will Not Accept Full
Responsibility for Fairness of Election, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 16,
2004), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1054335.html (discussing the U.S.
insistence that the elections must be “free and fair,” but that the ultimate
responsibility rests with Afghanistan).
158 See id. (discussing the months leading up to Afghanistan’s 2004
presidential election); see also President Hamid Karzai, supra note 127 (noting that
upon election in 2004, Karzai’s first term was slated to last for five years).
159 See Sayed Salahuddin, Factbox: Profiles of Key Afghan Presidential Candidates
(August 19, 2009), REUTERS, available at http://www.reuters.com/article
/2009/08/19/us-afghanistan-election-profiles-sb-idUSTRE57I1NJ20090819
(discussing the numerous presidential candidates in Afghanistan, and the need to
win more than 50% of the vote to avoid a run-off).
160 See Associated Press, Fraud Allegations Double in Afghan Election (Aug. 30,
2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32617636 (underscoring the 2,096
allegations of fraud and voter intimidation received by the complaints
commission).
161 North, supra note 91.
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the editorial coverage of candidates.162 There was also no “check”
on Afghanistan’s state-controlled media, as in America’s
democracy. There was no Saturday Night Live television program
making fun of the media-loving Barack Obama, or giving Sarah
Palin a chance to defend herself and be funny.163 How can there be
a legitimate democratic election if the key tenets of democracy are
disregarded in the electoral process?
More specifically, the 2004 election was marred by an indelible
ink scandal that tainted the vote count. In an effort to prevent
fraud and ensure an accurate vote count, the election polls for the
2004 Afghanistan Presidential election required each person to dip
their finger in indelible ink as they cast their vote.164 However,
numerous Afghans, including at least two presidential candidates,
complained that the ink used at the polling stations came off far
too easily, thereby allowing one person to vote multiple times.165
One presidential candidate Ramazan Badhardost, was so upset by
the fungible nature of the ink that he urged the Independent
Election Commission (IEC) to cancel the entire election.166 Said Mr.
Badhardost, “this is not an election, this is a comedy.”167
It is upon that basis, a farce of an election under the veil of a
fair democratic process, that the United States garnered
authorization from an “elected leader” to increase its military
involvement in Afghanistan. The international community should
be careful about accepting this as the model for compliance with
international law.
North, supra note 91.
See Afghanistan: Journalist Given Death Sentence for ‘Blasphemy’, RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY
(Jan.
23,
2008),
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079389.html (illustrating the extent to
which the Afghani media is controlled through an account of a journalist
sentenced to death for an article considered blasphemous). “Afghan media
outlets have sprung up in large numbers since the ouster of the hard-line Taliban
regime in late 2001, although press freedoms frequently run up against official
obstacles or opposition from conservative forces that include the clergy.” Id.
164 See Foreign Staff, Afghanistan Election: ‘Indelible Ink’ Washes Off Voters’
Fingers, TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk
/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6061343/Afghanistan-election-indelibleink-washes-off-voters-fingers.html (describing the ink as a less than satisfactory
safeguard against voter fraud due to its potential to be removed).
165 Id. See also Afghan Poll Hailed as a ‘Success’, BBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 2009, 5:46
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8212306.stm (noting a presidential candidate’s
complaint that the ink easily washed off).
166 Id. (noting that Bashardost “call[ed] on authorities to stop the election”).
167 Id.
162
163

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

04 WILLIAMS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

604

11/30/2011 8:25 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:2

5.2. Aftermath of the 2004 Election
After Karzai was elected President in 2004, nothing
immediately changed. He still lacked power outside of Kabul and
the drug warlords were still the actual rulers of Afghanistan.168 Yet
the United States continued to fight a war against the Taliban
under Karzai’s approval. As the war continued on, public support
in America and abroad began to wane.169 The United States was
continuing to use force against a former government of
Afghanistan. The more years the United States was removed from
9/11, the less Bush’s preemptive war doctrine seemed to apply. By
the arrival of the 2008 U.S. presidential election, presidential
hopeful Barack Obama campaigned on a promise to change the
way America fought the war on terror.170
While this overall mantra of change may have won Obama the
election by a landslide, it did not promise scaling back the war in
Afghanistan. Quite the contrary, as Obama’s first year in office
drew to a close, General McChrystal and others were telling the
President that he needed to vastly increase the number of
American troops in Afghanistan.171
2009 also marked the
conclusion of Karzai’s first term as “elected” President of
Afghanistan. Once again America had a great incentive to ensure
Karzai remained in office because it wanted to add tens of
thousands of more troops to fight the war in Afghanistan. What
168 See Harris, supra note 8, at 48–56 (describing the interim Afghan
government that was created during the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, and the
lack of authority that it possessed outside of the capital); Koh, supra note 8, at
1489–90 (citing the insufficient allocation of resources to geographical areas
outside of the capital as the reason for Karzai’s lack of control).
169 See Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., More Optimism About Iraq, Less About
Afghanistan, GALLUP (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/116920
/optimism-iraq-less-afghanistan.aspx (charting a decline in American optimism
toward military efforts in Afghanistan, but noting that the majority of Americans
still support the war in Afghanistan); Europeans Rally Against War in Afghanistan,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 20, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/International
/Article.aspx?id=115063 (characterizing heightened unpopularity of the war in
Afghanistan through European antiwar protests).
170 See Jake Tapper, Obama Delivers Bold Speech About War on Terror, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=3434573&page=1
(providing an overview of Barack Obama’s campaign initiatives pertaining to the
U.S. war on terror).
171 See Schmitt and Shanker, supra note 81 (describing a defense report
submitted by a U.S. general recommending deployment of more U.S. troops to
Afghanistan in order to bolster low confidence and defeat an increasingly “savvy”
insurgency).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss2/4

04 WILLIAMS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/30/2011 8:25 PM

AMERICA’S ILLEGAL WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

605

was true in 2004 was even truer in 2009—America needed legal
justification for the war, and without seeing any other legal basis
for being there, it needed consent from a legitimate leader.
Unfortunately for the United States and the continued legitimacy
of the use of force under international law, the 2009 Afghanistan
Presidential elections did not produce such a result.
5.3. The 2009 Afghanistan Election
This 2009 election drew even more questions and complaints
than those from 2004. This time one particular challenger to Karzai
emerged, Abdullah Abdullah. The election was held on August 20,
2009. After the initial votes came in, Abdullah and Karzai both
claimed victory.172 “As far as my campaign is concerned, I am in
the lead, and that’s despite the rigging which has taken place,”
Abdullah told the Associated Press.173
By August 30, Abdullah’s contentions about the election’s
fairness were proving true. There were more than 550 documented
specific and major allegations of fraud by August 30, just ten days
after the election.174 “The spike indicates just how pervasive ballot
box stuffing and voter intimidation may have been during the
country’s Aug. 20 vote, threatening the legitimacy of the
election.”175
After the votes were counted, it only got worse. By October,
“U.N. backed fraud investigators . . . threw out nearly a third of . . .
Karzai’s votes,” over one million total, because they were
fraudulent.176 That left Karzai short of the fifty percent majority he
172 Associated Press, Hamid Karzai, Rival Abdullah Abdullah Both Claim Victory
in Afghan Presidential Election, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 21, 2009,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2009/08/21/2009-0821_karzai_rival_both_claim_victory_in_afghan_prez_election.html.
173 Id.
174 See Afghanistan Election Marred by More than 550 Fraud Allegations, N.Y
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 30, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2009
/08/30/2009-08-30_afghanistan_election_marred_by_more_than_550_fraud
_allegations.html (describing the allegations against Karzai for corrupt election
practices and attributing the decline of Karazai’s popularity to the resurgence of
violence and his recruitment of former warlords to gain votes).
175 Id.
176 Nearly a Third of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s Votes Thrown Out by UN
Backed
Fraud
Investigators,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS,
Oct.
19,
2009,
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-10-19/news/17935872_1_karzaicampaign-spokesman-independent-election-commission-karzai-supporters. The
U.N. investigators were specifically assigned to watch over the 2009 election in an
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needed to win in Afghanistan and avoid a run-off against
Abdullah. This represented the worst case scenario for America—
proof that the elections were rigged and that Karzai was not the
rightful, legitimate leader of Afghanistan. However, these U.N.
backed investigators were only there to report the findings; it was
up to the IEC to announce the final results or commence with the
run-off.177
At the same time, Americans were dying every day in
Afghanistan at an increasingly alarming rate.178 American generals
urged the Obama administration to send more troops, but the
White House refused, claiming that “no decision on sending more
U.S. troops to Afghanistan would be made before the election crisis
is resolved . . . .”179 In other words, “[a] decision had been held up
in part because the blatant rigging of the August election
jeopardized the legitimacy of Karzai’s government, which has been
an important prerequisite for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy.”180
As such, the stage was set for the IEC to announce the run-off.
However, that never happened.
Every member of the IEC was appointed by Karzai.181 For two
straight weeks, the IEC made no pronouncement and gave no
indication that any runoff was coming. Not surprisingly, after two
weeks of inaction by the IEC, Abdullah had enough. Abdullah
officially put an end to the charade masquerading as an election by
attempt to avoid the scandals associated with the 2004 Afghanistan presidential
election. Afghanistan Election Marred by More than 550 Fraud Allegations, supra note
174. Unfortunately, they only served to verify the magnitude of the fraud in the
2009 election.
U.N. Official: 'Widespread Fraud' in Afghanistan Election,
FOXNEWS.COM
(Oct.
11,
2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2009
/10/11/official-widespread-fraud-afghanistan-election.
177 Id.
178 See, e.g., Afghanistan Coalition Military Fatalities By Year, ICAUSALITIES,
http://icasualties.org/ (diagraming American deaths per year in Afghanistan,
which include 98 deaths in 2006, 117 deaths in 2007, 155 deaths in 2008, and 317
deaths in 2009).
179 Nearly a Third of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s Votes Thrown Out by UN
Backed Fraud Investigators, supra note 176.
180 Kevin Whitelaw, Karzai ‘Victory’ Puts Spotlight on U.S. Troop Decision, NPR
(Nov.
2,
2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=120016883.
181 See Brian Kates, Afghan Election Commission Declares Hamid Karzai Winner,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world
/2009/11/02/2009-11-02_afghan_election_commission_declares_hamid
_karzai_winner_of_presidential_election.html (reporting on the IEC’s declaration
that Karzai won the presidential election by default).
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withdrawing, stating the ballot “would not have been fair” and
accusing the IEC of bias.182 Abdullah further said that a fair
election was “impossible.”183 Even Karzai admitted there was
widespread “fraud” in the election.184
Obama administration officials have repeatedly expressed
concerns about the credibility of the Karzai government.185 Obama
himself admitted “the process was messy, but was ‘in accordance’
with Afghan law.”186 This description rang hollow and exposed
America’s true feelings about the situation in Afghanistan—it
needed Karzai to win regardless of the cost. To wit, the day after
Abdullah’s withdrawal, the IEC declared Karzai the winner and
President of Afghanistan.187
Less than a month later, President Obama, with newly elected
President Karzai’s blessing, ordered more than 30,000 additional
American troops to fight in Afghanistan.188
6.

KARZAI IS NOT THE LEGITIMATE LEADER OF AFGHANISTAN

In order for the United States to utilize the consent doctrine as a
legal means for making war in Afghanistan, it needs consent from
the leader of Afghanistan. Despite the rigged elections, Karzai is
recognized as the leader of Afghanistan. Recognition is the
“formal acknowledgment by existing States of the normal political
consequences flowing from the status of the entity that is
recognized.”189 Recognition legitimizes a de facto leadership
situation.190 Furthermore, U.N. admission can equal recognition.191

Id.
Id.
184 See Ferran, supra note 20 (reporting that though Karzai represented that
“the election, as a whole, was good and free and democratic[,]” Karzai
nonetheless admitted to instances of electoral fraud).
185 See Kates, supra note 181 (noting that, in an effort to increase Karzai’s
credibility, various U.S. government officials had pressed Karzai to consent to a
run-off during the controversial 2009 Afghan election).
186 Whitelaw, supra note 180.
187 Id.
188 Obama, supra note 7.
189 CRAWFORD, supra note 133, at 539–40.
190 See id. at 540 (noting that the effect of a “collective acknowledgement of
status (or its collective denial)” is often “to legitimize a de facto situation”).
191 See id. (“[T]he collective acknowledgment of status that might have been
effected by a system of organized collective recognition is achieved by admission
to the United Nations . . . .”).
182
183
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For example, Karzai is the recognized leader of Afghanistan by the
United States and the U.N.192 At first glance this would seem to
end the inquiry. But it should not, because Karzai has little actual
power, and only remains in power through fraudulent elections
and support from the invading state to which he provides consent.
Because of all of the following, Hamid Karzai is not the legitimate
leader of Afghanistan, and therefore cannot legalize America’s
military intervention there.193
6.1. He Was Appointed
From 2001 through 2004, Karzai was only the Interim
Authority, specially appointed and not elected by the people. The
fact that the U.N. and expatriate groups in Germany decided that
Hamid Karzai would lead the Interim Authority raises suspicions
about the legitimacy of Karzai’s rule. Had Karzai been elected by
the Afghan people in 2001 in a fair and just election, such a result
would have favored legitimacy. But that is not what happened.
The result is an appointed leader, selected by a combination of
outside parties who are not all too familiar with the region.
6.2. For Years Karzai Maintained Only Temporary Status
It seems oxymoronic that by definition a temporary, or interim,
authority figure could have the power to invite in the military of
another state to make war there. Yet from 2001 through 2004, that
is precisely what happened. Worse still, in the case of Afghanistan,
that temporary authority, Karzai, was put in place (in part) by the
U.S. military. The argument that America has the authority to
militarily intervene because the pro-tem interim leader America
installed consents is as circular as it is illogical. This behavior is
also contrary to the U.N. Charter’s overall mantra commanding

192 See, e.g., Statement By His Excellency Hamid Karzai at the 61st Session of
the
U.N.
G.A.
(Sept.
20,
2006),
available
at
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/afghantistan-e.pdf (referring in a U.N.
document to Hamid Karzai as “His Excellency Hamid Karzai President of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan); Hamid Karazi Profile, ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT,
http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/kar0pro-1 (last updated Feb. 2,
2005) (recognizing Hamid Karzai as the president of Afghanistan).
193 There may be, in fact, no sole current leader of Afghanistan.
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states to refrain from unilaterally using force to promote their own
self-interests.194
6.3. Karzai Lacks Actual Control or Power Over the Region
As noted, Karzai’s temporary status changed when he was
“elected” in 2004 and 2009. Yet Karzai still lacks control and
exercises little power over the country he is supposedly leading.
From the beginning, “the authority of the interim governing
administration was circumscribed, state institutions were virtually
non-existent, and the Interim Authority exercised almost no
authority outside of the capital.”195 Karzai’s lack of control and
authority in Afghanistan has continued to the present. “The Karzai
regime has little authority over most of Afghanistan. Those who
exercise authority, such as local warlords, tend to be ultraconservative.”196
“[S]ecurity remains a major concern in that country
[Afghanistan] and the authority of the transitional government of
President Hamid Karzai is still being challenged.”197 Current Legal
Adviser to the U.S. State Department Harold Koh noted that
“[w]hile Hamid Karzai nominally acts as president of Afghanistan,
outside of Kabul, much of the country remains under the de facto
control of warlords and drug lords.”198 Even inside Kabul there is
chaos. For example, in July 2011, his most trusted bodyguard
killed Karzai’s brother.199 In short, Karzai does not and has never
had control over most of Afghanistan. He therefore cannot
legitimately grant access to something over which he does not have
control.
Worse still, Karzai’s lack of control is not even debatable, as
America admits he has no real power or control over Afghanistan.
For example, in late 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred
194 See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 3 (“All Members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”).
195 Harris, supra note 8, at 49.
196 Drumbl, supra note 130, at 360.
197 Panel Discussion, supra note 8, at 182.
198 Koh, supra note 8, at 1489.
199 See Julius Cavendish, Bodyguard Who Killed Karzai’s Brother was Trusted CIA
Contact,
INDEPENDENT
(London),
July
16,
2011,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bodyguard-who-killedkarzais-brother-was-trusted-cia-contact-2314580.html (noting that the bodyguard
had been recruited by the Taliban after working closely with U.S. officials).
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to Afghanistan as a “narco-state” with Karzai’s supposed
government “plagued by limited capacity and widespread
corruption.”200 A narco-state is “an area that has been taken over
and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels and where law
enforcement is effectively nonexistent.”201 This presents a situation
where the invading state admits that the alleged leader has no
control or authority over invaded Afghanistan, while
simultaneously relying on the alleged leader’s supposed legitimate
authority to make war in Afghanistan. Such a self-fulfilling
justification for war is fundamentally flawed and illegitimate.
6.4. Afghanistan’s Judiciary System is Corrupt
“[I]n every legal system some organ must be competent to
determine with certainty the subjects of the system. . . . [The
States’] determinations must have definitive legal effect.”202
Without definitive legal recourse and guidance coming from the
state government, the people will not be effectively governed by
the state. In Afghanistan, the corrupt judiciary system is further
evidence of a lack of legitimate and actual power from an alleged
leader and government.
For example, in December 2009, the mayor of Kabul was
sentenced to four years in prison on corruption charges.203
Initially, Afghans were thrilled to see the mayor finally have to
succumb to some rule of law in Afghanistan. However:
The very next day, . . . Sahebi [the disgraced mayor] was
back in the Mayoral Office after a higher court granted him
bail. And despite official statements that he is not allowed
to continue running the capital city, Sahebi did just that for
nearly a week before resigning on December 13.204

200 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, U.S. Resetting its Relationship with Karzai, WASH.
POST,
Nov.
20,
2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn
/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111903992.html?hpid=topnews.
201 Narco-state,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse
/narco-state (lasted visited Nov. 15, 2011).
202 CRAWFORD, supra note 133, at 20.
203 Abubakar Siddique, Weak Judiciary Pushes Some Afghans To Taliban, RADIO
FREE
EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY,
Dec.
13,
2009,
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1902781.html.
204 Id.
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Indeed, “[t]he fact that he stayed in office so long astonished
Afghans . . . it has placed the entire Afghan judiciary under the
spotlight.”205
Kabul University Professor Nasrullah Stanekzai agrees that
“[w]ithout a fundamentally strong judicial system we cannot find
our way to justice. And people cannot trust their government.”206
According to J. Alexander Tier, who oversees Afghanistan and
Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, the lack of the alleged
government’s ability to resolve disputes has done more than just
put the judiciary in the spotlight. “The Afghan government will
not be legitimate if it is not seen to be involved in the resolution of
disputes; if it is not seen to be involved in justice.”207
In sum, Karzai is not a legitimate ruler of Afghanistan;
therefore, the consent doctrine is not a legally viable method to
justify America’s continued use of force in Afghanistan.
7.

THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF FIGHTING THIS ILLEGAL WAR

America should be concerned about setting a troublesome
precedent with its continued military presence and fighting in
Afghanistan. Without any legal justification for the war on terror
in Afghanistan, America unwittingly opens the door for other
nations to undertake similar, decade-plus long “self-defense”
actions that result in thousands of innocent deaths per year, while
not legally being in self-defense. Nor do the attacks even have to
be against the people who attacked the now intruding state.
Following America’s lead, states may no longer need a U.N.
Security Council resolution to attack, nor approval from a
legitimate leader. Any nation, from North Korea to Iran, could
first invade a country, then facilitate installation of a leader who
was subsequently protected by its military, and then on the newly
installed leader’s apparent authority, continue making war for
more than a decade without any international legal repercussions.
The negative consequences of establishing such a precedent should
not be underestimated.
In addition, America’s illegal actions allow other nations to
deflect attention from their own wrongdoings and place the
205
206
207

Id. (quoting Kabul University law professor Najeeb Mahmood).
Id.
Id.
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spotlight squarely on America’s illegal war.
For example,
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has urged the United Nations
to open a fact-finding mission into the legality of America’s war in
Afghanistan.208 This was in 2010, even before bin Laden’s death in
Pakistan. By placing the international spotlight on America’s
illegal war in Afghanistan, Iran takes the spotlight off its somewhat
suspect uranium expeditions.209
8.

CONCLUSION

America’s continued war on terror in Afghanistan is somewhat
of a misnomer. It is no longer against al Qaeda terrorists but
against Taliban drug lords. The war is no longer (if it ever was) a
self-defense action, as those responsible for the attack, al Qaeda,
have long since left the region. This is further evidenced by bin
Laden’s 2011 death in Pakistan (where he had been living for more
than 5 years), not Afghanistan. The continued fighting also fails
under the scrutiny of Article 51’s elements of necessity and
proportionality. With al Qaeda gone and bin Laden dead,
America’s behavior is neither necessary nor proportional.
The fighting is also not taking place under the auspices of a
U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force.210
Without a Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the
continued attacks on the Taliban indefinitely, the only remaining
way for America to legally continue to use force against the
Taliban in Afghanistan is through the approval of a legitimate

208 See Barbara Plett, Iran Urges UN Inquiry into Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east
/8616850.stm (discussing Ahmadinejad’s request for a U.N. fact-finding team to
investigate the intentions and results of Western military action in Afghanistan
and Iraq, which coincided with a rise in international tension over Iran’s nuclear
program).
209 See id.
210 Instead, the Security Council has instituted a program, the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to promote the Afghani
government’s recovery efforts. See Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to
Help Promote Government-Led Recovery Efforts, U.N. Press Release SC/9889
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9889.doc.htm
(announcing and describing Resolution 1917 (2010), which realigns UNAMA “to
assist [Afghanistan’s] Government in the transition to national leadership of the
country’s recover efforts”).
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leader of Afghanistan. It is widely thought, even in America, that
Karzai is not a legitimate leader of Afghanistan.211
At this juncture, the war is most likely illegal. By continuing to
fight, America loses a significant amount of moral high ground
and tangible international leverage. America also unwittingly
establishes a precarious blueprint for future states to follow.
Whatever sound (or unsound) reasons American policymakers
have for continuing the war, its illegality foreshadows a
destabilizing future.

211 See Chandrasekaran, supra note 200 (detailing the efforts of U.S. officials to
get Karzai to accede to an election run-off, and implying a lack of American
confidence in the legitimacy of his position).
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